Contracts and productive information gathering
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Publication:1272619
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0651zbMath0912.90077OpenAlexW3125309366WikidataQ56213606 ScholiaQ56213606MaRDI QIDQ1272619
Jean-Charles Rochet, Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil
Publication date: 25 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0651
Related Items (39)
Competitive contracts with productive information gathering ⋮ GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT ⋮ Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract ⋮ The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ Price competition for an informed buyer ⋮ Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering ⋮ On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers ⋮ A note on robust procurement contracts ⋮ A principal-agent model of sequential testing ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives ⋮ When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework? ⋮ LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS ⋮ Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition ⋮ Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations ⋮ Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters ⋮ MONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Incentive mechanism design for public goods provision: Price cap regulation and optimal regulation ⋮ Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered ⋮ Informed principal and information gathering agent ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition ⋮ Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability ⋮ Ignorance in a multi-agent setting ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering
Cites Work
- Ignorance in agency problems
- All-or-nothing information control
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
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