Contracts and productive information gathering

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Publication:1272619

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0651zbMath0912.90077OpenAlexW3125309366WikidataQ56213606 ScholiaQ56213606MaRDI QIDQ1272619

Jean-Charles Rochet, Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil

Publication date: 25 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0651




Related Items (39)

Competitive contracts with productive information gatheringGATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENTGathering imperfect information before signing a contractThe value of information for auctioneersPrice competition for an informed buyerWholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gatheringOn information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellersA note on robust procurement contractsA principal-agent model of sequential testingEfficient mechanisms with information acquisitionParticipation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection modelsInformation gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting frameworkENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGNSignaling covertly acquired informationQuantum contracts between Schrödinger and a catSome Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism DesignInformation acquisition and countervailing incentivesWhen is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework?LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETSSequential negotiations with costly information acquisitionEx-ante licensing in sequential innovationsLearning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and productionBargaining with endogenous informationStrategic obscurity in the forecasting of disastersMONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATIONAuction design with endogenously correlated buyer typesThe costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structuresEndogenous information and stochastic contractsAuctions with costly information acquisitionIncentive mechanism design for public goods provision: Price cap regulation and optimal regulationOptimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisitionContracts with endogenous informationStrategic information gathering before a contract is offeredInformed principal and information gathering agentOptimal auctions with information acquisitionTry before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisitionUpfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiabilityIgnorance in a multi-agent settingPessimistic information gathering



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