Contracts and productive information gathering
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Publication:1272619
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0651zbMath0912.90077WikidataQ56213606 ScholiaQ56213606MaRDI QIDQ1272619
Jean-Charles Rochet, Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil
Publication date: 25 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0651
91B44: Economics of information
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Cites Work
- Ignorance in agency problems
- All-or-nothing information control
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
