Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition
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Publication:2294293
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.03.004zbMATH Open1476.91075OpenAlexW2921001012WikidataQ128256170 ScholiaQ128256170MaRDI QIDQ2294293FDOQ2294293
Authors: Song Huang, Wen-Qiang Xiao, Jun Yang
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.004
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Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
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- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information
- Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management
- Do firms invest in forecasting efficiently? The effect of competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination
Cited In (11)
- Optimal ordering decision and information leakage preference under asymmetric forecast signal
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Observability of retailer demand information acquisition in a dual-channel supply chain
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Optimal Preorder Strategy with Endogenous Information Control
- Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management
- Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information
- On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
- Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
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