Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.03.004MaRDI QIDQ2294293zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Song Huang, Wen-Qiang Xiao, Jun Yang

Publication date 10 February 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionquantity discountsendogenous adverse selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5076448 (Why is no real title available?)
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Do firms invest in forecasting efficiently? The effect of competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination
• Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information
• Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management

Cited in

(14)

• Optimal Preorder Strategy with Endogenous Information Control
• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
• Observability of retailer demand information acquisition in a dual-channel supply chain
• Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering
• Contracting for information acquisition
• Optimal ordering decision and information leakage preference under asymmetric forecast signal
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management
• Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information
• Information acquisition for service contract quotations made by repair shops
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5613824 (Why is no real title available?)

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