Contracts with endogenous information
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Publication:1007781
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.012zbMath1159.91016OpenAlexW2167327724MaRDI QIDQ1007781
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269750/files/twerp_780.pdf
copulaasymmetric informationvalue of informationstochastic orderinginformation acquisitionmechanism design
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Related Items (20)
Competitive contracts with productive information gathering ⋮ Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract ⋮ Collaborative product development: managing supplier incentives for key component testing ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives ⋮ When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework? ⋮ LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS ⋮ The simple economics of white elephants ⋮ Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters ⋮ MONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation ⋮ Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced? ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Motivating informed decisions ⋮ Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering
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