ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
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Publication:6122164
DOI10.1111/iere.12634OpenAlexW3083699642MaRDI QIDQ6122164
Publication date: 27 March 2024
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12634
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)
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