Competitive disclosure of correlated information
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Publication:2074043
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Cites work
- A model of expertise
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Competition in persuasion
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
- Sequential cheap talks
- Sequential persuasion
- Strategic Information Transmission
Cited in
(17)- Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk
- Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Competition in persuasion
- Interactive information design
- Long information design
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Informational correlation and selective disclosure
- Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
- ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
- Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion
- On the possibility of strategic ignorance in sequential persuasion
- Media competition and information disclosure
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