Sequential persuasion

DOI10.3982/TE3474MaRDI QIDQ5164469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3474

zbMATH Keywords

communicationmultiple sendersBayesian persuasioncompetition in persuasionsequential persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cited in

(17)

• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• Long persuasion games
• Dynamic persuasion
• Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Long information design
• Multi-agent persuasion: leveraging strategic uncertainty
• Optimal sequential contests
• Reputation-based persuasion platforms
• Endogenous threshold selection with two-interval restricted tests
• Sequential legislative lobbying
• Competition in persuasion: an experiment
• Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
• Shuttle diplomacy

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