Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00036-XMaRDI QIDQ1399562zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Frédéric Koessler

Publication date 30 July 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00036-X

zbMATH Keywords

higher-order uncertaintyPersuasion gamesprovabilityStrategic information revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Recommendations

• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Long persuasion games
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Sequential persuasion
• Coordination and private information revelation

Cites work

• ``Knowing whether, ``knowing that, and the cardinality of state spaces
• Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Sequential Equilibria
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(13)

• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Coordination and private information revelation
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Higher order uncertainty and information: static and dynamic games
• Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
• Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
• Verifiable disclosure
• Long persuasion games
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

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