Recommendations
Cited in
(32)- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- Long persuasion games
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
- Designing interrogations
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Unraveling of product information with discrete prices
- Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
- A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Disclosure of product information after price competition
- To invite or not to invite a lobby, that is the question
- Implementation with partial provability
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Strategic communication with reporting costs
- Balance of opinions in expert panels
- Strategic argumentation
- Proof and refutation in MALL as a game
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- Information transmission and voting
- Expert panels with selective investigation
- Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
- The order of presentation in trials: plaintive plaintiffs
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation
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