The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1066zbMATH Open0811.90136OpenAlexW2080223316MaRDI QIDQ1339751FDOQ1339751

Hyun Song Shin

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1066

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zbMATH Keywords

decision rulearbitrator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Cited In (28)

• Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Long persuasion games
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
• Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
• Implementation with partial provability
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Strategic communication with reporting costs
• Balance of opinions in expert panels
• Strategic argumentation
• Proof and refutation in MALL as a game
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Information transmission and voting
• Expert panels with selective investigation
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question
• Mixed up? That's good for motivation

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