Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
- A model of expertise
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
- Disclosures and Asset Returns
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Optimal Statistical Decisions
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
Cited in
(18)- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Dynamic persuasion
- Persuasion with communication costs
- A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
- Public communication with externalities
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- To invite or not to invite a lobby, that is the question
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Information acquisition and the value of bad news
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Balance of opinions in expert panels
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7599965 (Why is no real title available?)
- Pathways of persuasion
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747923 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- Expert panels with selective investigation
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