Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
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Publication:485574
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.013zbMATH Open1302.91063OpenAlexW2068169170MaRDI QIDQ485574FDOQ485574
Authors: Roland Hodler, Simon Loertscher, Dominic Rohner 
Publication date: 12 January 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.013
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- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Experimental design to persuade
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
- Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
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