Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.013MaRDI QIDQ485574zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roland Hodler, Simon Loertscher, Dominic Rohner

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

costly signalingpersuasioninformation distortionexpert advice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• The costs of deception: Evidence from psychology
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• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
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• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

Cites work

• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Experimental design to persuade
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic communication with lying costs

Cited in

(4)

• The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Influential news and policy-making
• Strategic argumentation

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