Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.05.008MaRDI QIDQ632963zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Itai Sher

Publication date 28 March 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

evidencecommitmentconcavitydeterminismcredibilityoptimal persuasion rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Dynamic persuasion
• A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Persuasion with costly precision
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

Cites work

• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(14)

• Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Reputazione e credibilità di una minaccia in un gioco di contrattazione
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
• Strategic communication with reporting costs
• Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
• A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Attributes: selective learning and influence

This page was built for publication: Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q632963)