Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
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(19)- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Strategic communication with reporting costs
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Reputazione e credibilità di una minaccia in un gioco di contrattazione
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
- Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
- Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
- Attributes: selective learning and influence
- Screening for breakthroughs
- Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
- Persuasion with verifiable information
- Project selection with partially verifiable information
- Algorithmic persuasion with evidence
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