Persuasion with costly precision

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01346-9zbMATH Open1482.91039OpenAlexW3135117498WikidataQ115161172 ScholiaQ115161172MaRDI QIDQ2074047FDOQ2074047

Authors: Arianna Degan, Ming Li 

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234748

Recommendations

• Persuasion with communication costs
• Persuasion under ambiguity
• Persuasion as a contest
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Persuasion under costly learning
• Pivotal persuasion
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Dynamic persuasion
• Pathways of persuasion

zbMATH Keywords

persuasionsignallingprecisionstrategic communicationcostly signalsD1 equilibriumoptimal information provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game theory
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Market signaling with grades
• Misinformation
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Informational Equilibrium
• Competition in persuasion
• Monopolistic signal provision
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Persuasion with communication costs
• Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
• When to drop a bombshell

Cited In (24)

• Testing under information manipulation
• Persuasion under costly learning
• Persuasion under ambiguity
• Pivotal persuasion
• Dynamic persuasion
• Waiting to Persuade
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Persuasion with communication costs
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Slow persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Persuasion and receiver's news
• A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Resisting persuasion
• Experimental design to persuade

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