Persuasion with costly precision

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01346-9zbMath1482.91039WikidataQ115161172 ScholiaQ115161172MaRDI QIDQ2074047

Ming Li, Arianna Degan

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234748

zbMATH Keywords

precision; persuasion; signalling; strategic communication; costly signals; D1 equilibrium; optimal information provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender, Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion, Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment, Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Market signaling with grades
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Sequential decisions with tests
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
• Persuasion with communication costs
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Monopolistic Signal Provision
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Competition in Persuasion
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Informational Equilibrium
• When to Drop a Bombshell
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• MISINFORMATION*