Competition in Persuasion
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3382376
DOI10.1093/restud/rdw052zbMath1471.91055MaRDI QIDQ3382376
Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow
Publication date: 21 September 2021
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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