On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.028zbMath1393.91019OpenAlexW43072628MaRDI QIDQ1691374

Maria Goltsman, Sourav Bhattacharya, Arijit Mukherjee

Publication date: 16 January 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.028

zbMATH Keywords

panel designpersuasion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Informational correlation and selective disclosure, The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders, When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication, Expert panels with selective investigation, Balance of opinions in expert panels, Strategic communication with reporting costs

Cites Work

• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Strategic argumentation
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• A Simple Model of Voice
• A Model of Expertise
• Competition in Persuasion
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Cheap Talk and Editorial Control
• Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
• Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.