Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness

DOI10.3982/ECTA14991MaRDI QIDQ5225124zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman

Publication date 19 July 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessevidencecommitmentmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Evidence reading mechanisms

Cited in

(18)

• Testing under information manipulation
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Direct implementation with evidence
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility
• Partial credence goods on review platforms

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