Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness

DOI10.3982/ECTA14991zbMATH Open1422.91135WikidataQ128204579 ScholiaQ128204579MaRDI QIDQ5225124FDOQ5225124

Authors: Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman 

Publication date: 19 July 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

robustnessevidencecommitmentmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (18)

• Testing under information manipulation
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Direct implementation with evidence
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
• Partial credence goods on review platforms
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility

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