Evidence reading mechanisms
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Publication:2325665
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01187-5zbMath1425.91153OpenAlexW2936039107MaRDI QIDQ2325665
Eduardo Perez-Richet, Frédéric Koessler
Publication date: 27 September 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
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