Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.12.006MaRDI QIDQ2519482zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Raymond Deneckere, Sergei Severinov

Publication date 26 January 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Implementation with partial verification
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Implementation with partial provability
• Implementation with evidence

Cites work

• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(26)

• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions
• Direct implementation with evidence
• Selling with evidence
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
• Implementation with evidence
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Implementation via rights structures
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Implementation with partial provability
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Experimental design to persuade
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information

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