Bayesian implementation with verifiable information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.003zbMath1417.91298OpenAlexW2937328490MaRDI QIDQ2002347

Esteban Peralta

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designverifiable informationBayesian implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Implementation with partial provability
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Implementation in differential information economies
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation with evidence
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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