Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
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Publication:2002347
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.003zbMath1417.91298OpenAlexW2937328490MaRDI QIDQ2002347
Publication date: 12 July 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.003
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Implementation with partial provability
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Implementation in differential information economies
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
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