Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
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Publication:617583
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.06.002zbMATH Open1232.91200OpenAlexW3126075511MaRDI QIDQ617583FDOQ617583
Authors: Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra 
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62639
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- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
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monotonicityincomplete informationincentive compatibilityapproximate implementationexact implementation
Cites Work
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Implementation in differential information economies
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
- Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
Cited In (11)
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
- Rationalizable implementation
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Weak implementation
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
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