Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
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Publication:617583
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.002zbMath1232.91200MaRDI QIDQ617583
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62639
monotonicity; incomplete information; incentive compatibility; approximate implementation; exact implementation
Related Items
Mechanism design and communication networks, Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability, Rationalizable implementation, A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies, Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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