Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission
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Publication:2959837
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_21zbMath1404.91025arXiv1509.00337OpenAlexW2233597701MaRDI QIDQ2959837
Martin Hoefer, Bojana Kodric, Thomas Kesselheim
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.00337
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Welfare economics (91B15)
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Cites Work
- Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
- Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission
- Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
- On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
- Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
- Composable and efficient mechanisms
- Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
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