scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427
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Publication:5365075
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053323
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(35)- Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
- Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
- Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
- Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
- From pricing to prophets, and back!
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
- A simple optimal contention resolution scheme for uniform matroids
- Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission
- Submodular stochastic probing on matroids
- Prophet secretary
- Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
- From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies
- Optimal online contention resolution schemes via ex-ante prophet inequalities
- Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals
- Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms
- Tight revenue gaps among multiunit mechanisms
- Fairness in Influence Maximization through Randomization
- Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
- Correlation-robust analysis of single item auction
- Prophet secretary
- Correlation robust stochastic optimization
- Online contention resolution schemes with applications to Bayesian selection problems
- On the correlation gap of matroids
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- Buy-many mechanisms for many unit-demand buyers
- Optimal stopping with multi-dimensional comparative loss aversion
- Prophet inequalities via the expected competitive ratio
- On submodular prophet inequalities and correlation gap
- Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
- The outer limits of contention resolution on matroids and connections to the secretary problem
- Pairwise independent correlation gap
- On the correlation gap of matroids
- q-partitioning valuations: exploring the space between subadditive and fractionally subadditive valuations
- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
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