Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.006MaRDI QIDQ2386136zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sérgio O. Parreiras

Publication date 22 August 2005

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.17615/nd81-sk34

zbMATH Keywords

Blackwell's theoremInformation rentsSurplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072561

Cites work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• A simple proof of Blackwell's Comparison of experiments theorem
• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Surplus extraction and competition
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Cited in

(9)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Mechanism design with information acquisition
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

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