Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.006zbMATH Open1114.91078OpenAlexW4299958041MaRDI QIDQ2386136FDOQ2386136

Authors: Sérgio O. Parreiras 

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.17615/nd81-sk34

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zbMATH Keywords

Blackwell's theoremInformation rentsSurplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• A simple proof of Blackwell's Comparison of experiments theorem
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Continuity in auction design
• Surplus extraction and competition

Cited In (9)

• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Mechanism design with information acquisition
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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