Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.05.005MaRDI QIDQ643288zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz

Publication date 28 October 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

Blackwell's theoremcorrelated informationmechanism designsurplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
• Erratum to: ``Sufficiency in Blackwell's theorem [Math. Social Sci. 46(1) (2003) 21-25]

Cites work

• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(3)

• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

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