Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.05.007MaRDI QIDQ996382zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. K. Bose, Jinhua Zhao

Publication date 14 September 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

correlated signalsrent extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Cites work

• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design

Cited in

(13)

• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
• Information orders in screening problems
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

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