Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
From MaRDI portal
Publication:996382
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007zbMath1186.91045MaRDI QIDQ996382
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007
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Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification, Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types, Optimal contracts with contingent allocation, A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
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