Information orders in screening problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the value of public information in monopoly
- A simple proof of Blackwell's Comparison of experiments theorem
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Calibrated incentive contracts
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Comparing information in general monotone decision problems
- Comparing location experiments
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- Game theory
- Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
- Informed principal with correlation
- Monopoly and product quality
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
- Payoff implications of incentive contracting
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
- Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
- Strategic sample selection
- The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
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