Optimal Auction Design
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
- Auctions with a buy price
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Biased procurement auctions
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
- The power of verification for one-parameter agents
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanisms in one shot
- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
- Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases
- Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- Auctions with a buy price: the case of reference-dependent preferences
- A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
- Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
- Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship
- An adjustment scheme for nonlinear pricing problem with two buyers
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Bunching properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Optimal constrained bidding
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- Search mechanisms
- Involuntary unemployment and worker self-selection
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Continuity in auction design
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
- Pollution claim settlements under correlated information
- Multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions with variable awards
- A learning approach to auctions
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- Price-preference vs. Tariff policies in government procurement auctions
- A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
- An optimal auction for complements
- Sequentially optimal auctions
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Coordination and externalities
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- \(k\)-price auctions
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- \(k\)th price auctions and Catalan numbers
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
- The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Revenue in contests with many participants
- A note on the continuity of the optimal auction
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
- Price reveal auctions
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- On the regulation of procurement bids
- A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing
- Distributed investment decisions and forecasting errors: an analysis based on a multi-agent simulation model
- Two-part tariff contracting with competing unreliable suppliers in a supply chain under asymmetric information
- Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market
- On the redistributive power of pensions
- Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
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