Optimal Auction Design
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions
- Mechanisms for dual-role-facility location games: truthfulness and approximability
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Digital collateral
- A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
- Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines
- A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem
- Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
- Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
- Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Unfair contests
- Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
- Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.
- Dual mechanism for an online retailer
- English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction
- A learning approach to auctions
- Buy-price English auction
- Transfer of authority within hierarchies
- Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
- On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts
- Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
- Optimal constrained bidding
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
- Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
- Mechanism design for correlated valuations: efficient methods for revenue maximization
- Procurement with cost and noncost attributes: cost-sharing mechanisms
- Deals or no deals: contract design for online advertising
- ``Now or later? When to deploy qualification screening in open-bid auction for re-sourcing
- Optimal discounts in green public procurement
- A practical multi-objective auction design and optimization framework for sponsored search
- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- Discrete and Bayesian transaction fee mechanisms
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Coordination and externalities
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Symmetric mechanism design
- An online sequential procurement mechanism under uncertain demands in multi-cloud environment
- Sponsored search auction design beyond single utility maximization
- Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects
- Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Packing under convex quadratic constraints
- Optimal testing and social distancing of individuals with private health signals
- Surplus extraction with rich type spaces
- On favoritism in auctions with entry
- Efficient and effective budget-feasible mechanisms for submodular valuations
- Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
- Procurement with competing insiders
- Procuring drugs while regulating the private market
- Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
- Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
- Contests with insurance
- Premium auctions in the field
- On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
- Reserve prices in second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders
- Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
- Packing under convex quadratic constraints
- Improved two sample revenue guarantees via mixed-integer linear programming
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions
- Ordering sellers in sequential auctions
- Combinatorial auctions
- Organ donation with vouchers
- The value of mediated communication
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Involuntary unemployment and worker self-selection
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
- Optimal multi-attribute auctions for divisible goods
- On the correlation gap of matroids
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Robust monopoly pricing
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- Optimal procurement auctions with audit
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
This page was built for publication: Optimal Auction Design
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3960505)
