Search mechanisms
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Extending the Revelation Principle to a case in which it is costly for the principal to communicate with any agent, we show that there is a sequential direct mechanism that is optimal in the class of all mechanisms. We then apply this result to the problem of a monopsonist seeking to buy an indivisible good from one of a set of possible sellers with unobservable production costs. With costly communication, the monopsonist's optimal procurement mechanism is a combination of reservation-price search and auction.
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Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Duration of offers, price structure, and the gain from search
- Equilibrium Price Dispersion
- On the difficulty of eliciting summary information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Optimal Search
- Search and Optimal Sample Sizes
- Strategic Search Theory
Cited in
(18)- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Search from an unknown distribution: An explicit solution
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Sequential selling mechanisms
- Duality in procurement design
- A simple model of price dispersion
- Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
- Optimal search auctions
- Participation in auctions
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Increasing threshold search for best-valued agents
- Search combinators
- Nonparametric search
- Identification and estimation of a search model with heterogeneous consumers and firms
- Optimal selling mechanisms with endogenous seller outside offers
- Physical search
- Human-guided search
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