Duality in procurement design

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2003.11.005MaRDI QIDQ1877829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date 19 August 2004

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionsBargainingDualityLinear programmingMechanism designProcurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
• Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
• Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
• DEA based auctions
• Search mechanisms

Cites work

• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029251 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multidimensional auctions
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• On the regulation of procurement bids
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms

Cited in

(5)

• Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement.
• Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
• Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk
• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
• Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products

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