On the regulation of procurement bids

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90006-MzbMATH Open1375.91100OpenAlexW2028745429MaRDI QIDQ1676741FDOQ1676741

Authors: Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne 

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90006-m

Recommendations

• Probabilistic procurement auctions
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions

Cited In (6)

• Winning by default: why is there so little competition in government procurement?
• Duality in procurement design
• Two rules of a sealed ceiling bid and their analysis by mathematical programming techniques
• Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions
• Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

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