On the regulation of procurement bids

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90006-MMaRDI QIDQ1676741zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne

Publication date 9 November 2017

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90006-m

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Probabilistic procurement auctions
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19089 (Why is no real title available?)
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(6)

• Winning by default: why is there so little competition in government procurement?
• Duality in procurement design
• Two rules of a sealed ceiling bid and their analysis by mathematical programming techniques
• Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything
• Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

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