Winning by Default: Why is There So Little Competition in Government Procurement?
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Publication:5090038
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB051zbMath1497.91159OpenAlexW2740683722MaRDI QIDQ5090038
Publication date: 15 July 2022
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab051
principal-agent modelauctionnegotiationstructural estimationprocurementendogenous competitioncontract menusemi-parametric identification
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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