Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions

DOI10.3982/ECTA17155zbMATH Open1492.91140OpenAlexW4206996456MaRDI QIDQ5087296FDOQ5087296

Authors: Sylvain Chassang, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner 

Publication date: 11 July 2022

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17155

Recommendations

• Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders
• Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
• Probabilistic procurement auctions
• On the regulation of procurement bids

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustrobustnesscompetitionprocurementmissing bids

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (3)

• Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
• Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models
• Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?

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