Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions

DOI10.3982/ECTA17155MaRDI QIDQ5087296zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Chassang, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner

Publication date 11 July 2022

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17155

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustrobustnesscompetitionprocurementmissing bids

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(3)

• Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
• Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?
• Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models

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