Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAC013zbMATH Open1505.91185OpenAlexW4214580494MaRDI QIDQ5877765FDOQ5877765

Authors: Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner, Sylvain Chassang 

Publication date: 16 February 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac013

Recommendations

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
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• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

zbMATH Keywords

regression discontinuitycollusionincumbencyprocurementbackloganti-trust

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (1)

• Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?

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