Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
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Publication:645060
DOI10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9zbMath1278.91078OpenAlexW1996348331MaRDI QIDQ645060
Giuseppe Lopomo, Peng Sun, Leslie M. Marx
Publication date: 8 November 2011
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9
Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement ⋮ Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
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