Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S10058-010-0104-9MaRDI QIDQ645060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie M. Marx, Peng Sun

Publication date 8 November 2011

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingmechanism designcartelbidding ring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bidder collusion
• Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
• On ring formation in auctions
• Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1914171 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bidder collusion
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Microeconomic theory
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
• Optimal Bidding in Sequential Auctions
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• The vulnerability of auctions to bidder collusion

Cited in

(19)

• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
• Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
• Collusive behavior of bidders in English auctions: a cooperative game theoretic analysis
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: an analysis of the post-auction ``knockout sale.
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
• Bidding collusion without passive updating
• Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
• First-best collusion without communication
• Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement
• On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
• A simple model of coalitional bidding
• Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Bidder collusion

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