Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
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Publication:645060
DOI10.1007/S10058-010-0104-9zbMATH Open1278.91078OpenAlexW1996348331MaRDI QIDQ645060FDOQ645060
Authors: Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie M. Marx, Peng Sun 
Publication date: 8 November 2011
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9
Recommendations
Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Microeconomic theory
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Optimal Bidding in Sequential Auctions
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Bidder collusion
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- The vulnerability of auctions to bidder collusion
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (19)
- Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
- Collusive behavior of bidders in English auctions: a cooperative game theoretic analysis
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: an analysis of the post-auction ``knockout sale.
- Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
- Bidding collusion without passive updating
- Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
- First-best collusion without communication
- Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement
- On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
- A simple model of coalitional bidding
- Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Bidder collusion
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
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