Private monitoring in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.007MaRDI QIDQ860353zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues

Publication date 9 January 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2003/ii03-14.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscartelsrepeated gamestacit collusionwithholding information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Sequentially optimal auctions
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Cites work

• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bidder collusion
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Monopoly Experimentation
• Optimal Learning by Experimentation
• Sequential Equilibria
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.

Cited in

(13)

• Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• First-best collusion without communication
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Taking turns
• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Strategic experimentation with private payoffs

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