Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
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(27)- Biased procurement auctions
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Reference Bayesian inference in nonregular models.
- Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
- Asymmetric first price auctions
- Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
- Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule
- Competition, collusion, and chaos
- Bidder collusion
- Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
- Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
- Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
- Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions
- Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions
- Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions
- Asymmetry and collusion in sequential procurement: a ``large lot last policy
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
- Using simulation methods for bayesian econometric models: inference, development,and communication
- Bayesian estimation approaches to first-price auctions
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
- Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
- Private monitoring in auctions
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