Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.011MaRDI QIDQ550201zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom Shneyerov

Publication date 8 July 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4492

zbMATH Keywords

nonparametric identificationauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
• Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• Note on Extreme Values, Competing Risks and Semi-Markov Processes
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach

Cited in

(6)

• Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
• Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
• Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach
• Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities.
• Identification of auction models using order statistics
• Identification of mixture models using support variations

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