Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011zbMath1217.91080MaRDI QIDQ550201

Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4492

zbMATH Keywords

auctions; nonparametric identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Identification of mixture models using support variations, Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach, Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test

Cites Work

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