Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
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Publication:550201
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.011zbMATH Open1217.91080OpenAlexW2156879907MaRDI QIDQ550201FDOQ550201
Authors: Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom Shneyerov 
Publication date: 8 July 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4492
Cites Work
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
- Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
- Note on Extreme Values, Competing Risks and Semi-Markov Processes
- What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
- Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
Cited In (6)
- Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
- Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach
- Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities.
- Identification of auction models using order statistics
- Identification of mixture models using support variations
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