Identification of auction models using order statistics
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Publication:6133350
DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2023.04.003arXiv2205.12917OpenAlexW4381059766MaRDI QIDQ6133350FDOQ6133350
Publication date: 18 August 2023
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this gap by providing a set of positive identification results. First, we show that symmetric auctions with discrete unobserved heterogeneity are identifiable using two consecutive order statistics and an instrument. Second, we extend the results to ascending auctions with unknown competition and unobserved heterogeneity.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.12917
finite mixturemultidimensional unobserved heterogeneityconsecutive order statisticsunobserved competition
Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
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