Identification of auction models using order statistics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6133350
Abstract: Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this gap by providing a set of positive identification results. First, we show that symmetric auctions with discrete unobserved heterogeneity are identifiable using two consecutive order statistics and an instrument. Second, we extend the results to ascending auctions with unknown competition and unobserved heterogeneity.
Cites work
- A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions
- Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
- Convergence rates for density estimation with Bernstein polynomials.
- Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
- Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
- Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
- Identification and estimation of incomplete information games with multiple equilibria
- Identification and estimation of nonlinear models with misclassification error using instrumental variables: a general solution
- Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values
- Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
- Nonparametric estimation of the measurement error model using multiple indicators.
- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- TESTS OF RANK
- The econometrics of unobservables: applications of measurement error models in empirical industrial organization and labor economics
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Identification of auction models using order statistics
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6133350)