Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values
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Publication:2857547
DOI10.3982/ECTA9431zbMATH Open1274.91208OpenAlexW2137599864MaRDI QIDQ2857547FDOQ2857547
Authors: Andrés Aradillas-López, Amit Gandhi, Daniel Quint
Publication date: 4 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9431
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Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cited In (26)
- Bidding frictions in ascending auctions
- Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
- Testing for a general class of functional inequalities
- Nonparametric inference based on conditional moment inequalities
- Partial identification in asymmetric auctions in the absence of independence
- Order statistics approaches to unobserved heterogeneity in auctions
- Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management
- Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
- Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- Identification of auction models using order statistics
- Deconvolution from two order statistics
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions
- Estimating unobserved individual heterogeneity using pairwise comparisons
- Inference in ordered response games with complete information
- Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids
- A simple test for moment inequality models with an application to English auctions
- Two results on auctions with endogenous entry
- Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
- On the choice of test statistic for conditional moment inequalities
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