Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.06.017zbMath1420.91110OpenAlexW2013367794MaRDI QIDQ278042

Bjarne Brendstrup, Harry J. Paarsch

Publication date: 2 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.06.017

zbMATH Keywords

nonparametric identificationsequentialasymmetricEnglish and Dutch auctionsfish auctionsmulti-unitsemi-nonparametric estimation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions ⋮ A simple nonparametric test for synergies in multi-object sequential English auctions ⋮ Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions ⋮ A practical guide to compact infinite dimensional parameter spaces ⋮ Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature

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