Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game

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Publication:5472993

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00455zbMath1154.91414OpenAlexW3123396550MaRDI QIDQ5472993

Mireia Jofre-Bonet, Martin Pesendorfer

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8626.pdf




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