The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.013zbMath1309.91057MaRDI QIDQ2254041

Pablo F. Beker, Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/82250/1/WRAP-dynamics-bidding-markets-Beker-2015.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

industry dynamics; markups; all pay auctions; financial constraints; bidding markets; money left on the table

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Cites Work

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