The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.013MaRDI QIDQ2254041zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo F. Beker, Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date 4 February 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/82250/1/WRAP-dynamics-bidding-markets-Beker-2015.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

all pay auctionsbidding marketsfinancial constraintsindustry dynamicsmarkupsmoney left on the table

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• High bids and broke winners
• Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
• Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
• Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economies
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(5)

• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Constrained equilibrium in a bidding problem
• A model and procedure for competitive bidding under resource constraints
• Auctioning big facilities under financial constraints
• Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings

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