Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics
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Publication:3564687
DOI10.3982/ECTA6994zbMath1229.91053OpenAlexW3023044121MaRDI QIDQ3564687
Yaroslav Kryukov, Ulrich Doraszelski, David Besanko, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 26 May 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6994
multiple equilibrialearning-by-doingMarkov-perfect equilibriumindustry dynamicsdynamic stochastic gamesorganizational forgetting
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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