The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.004zbMATH Open1252.91012OpenAlexW2170339596MaRDI QIDQ634531FDOQ634531

Authors: Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto 

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8896226

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zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamefolk theoremimperfect public monitoringreturn-generationself-generation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cites Work

• Stochastic Games
• Stochastic games
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Noncooperative Stochastic Games
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown

Cited In (25)

• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
• Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
• Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
• Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• Myopic perception in repeated games
• Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
• Stochastic games with hidden states
• Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
• The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
• Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
• The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
• Stochastic games
• Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
• Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
• Communicating zero-sum product stochastic games

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