The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.004zbMath1252.91012MaRDI QIDQ634531

Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8896226

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic game; folk theorem; imperfect public monitoring; return-generation; self-generation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

Related Items

A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes, The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting, Stochastic Games, Cooperative teaching and learning of actions, Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game, Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games, Fully absorbing dynamic compromise, Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal, A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model, Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers, A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring, Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs, Myopic perception in repeated games, Communicating zero-sum product stochastic games, Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality, A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games, Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring, Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags, On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games, Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games

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