The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
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Cites work
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
- How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?*
- Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
- Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics
- Noncooperative Stochastic Games
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
- Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
- Stochastic Games
- Stochastic games
- The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(25)- Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Stochastic games
- The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
- Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
- Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
- Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
- On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
- Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
- Stochastic games with hidden states
- Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
- Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
- A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
- Communicating zero-sum product stochastic games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620860 (Why is no real title available?)
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
- Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
- A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
- The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
- Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
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