Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.006MaRDI QIDQ6584590zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Xavier Venel, Anna Zseleva

Publication date 8 August 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesswitching costsfolk theoremstochastic gamesnon-zero-sum games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation

Cites work

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• The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• The traveling inspector model

Cited in

(3)

• Games with switching costs and endogenous references
• The price of history-independent strategies in games with inter-temporal externalities
• The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs

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