Switching costs in infinitely repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.018zbMath1161.91319OpenAlexW2131422298MaRDI QIDQ1021599

Ruqu Wang, Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.018

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Reputation building through costly adjustment ⋮ Games with switching costs and endogenous references ⋮ Tempered best response dynamics ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Stochastic revision opportunities in Markov decision problems ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games

Cites Work

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• Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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