Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
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Cites work
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
- Game theory
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cited in
(12)- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Tempered best response dynamics
- How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
- Stochastic revision opportunities in Markov decision problems
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Reputation building through costly adjustment
- Games with switching costs and endogenous references
- The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs
- Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
- The price of history-independent strategies in games with inter-temporal externalities
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Dynamic coordination with switching costs
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