Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3479762 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3599745 (Why is no real title available?)
- Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Equity Among Generations
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential Equilibria
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
Cited in
(69)- A competitive search game with a moving target
- Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks
- Decentralized learning from failure
- Asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Stackelberg games
- Topological essentiality in infinite games
- Well-founded extensive games with perfect information
- A game-theoretic approach for the synthesis of complex systems
- Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in games with almost perfect information
- Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
- Automatic verification of concurrent stochastic systems
- Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games
- Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
- Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities
- On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
- On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures
- Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets
- Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games
- General time consistent discounting
- Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
- Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon
- Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short- term players
- Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information
- Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity
- Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy
- Optimistic stability in games of perfect information
- Coalgebraic analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite games without discounting
- Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games
- Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
- On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
- Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model
- Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information
- The complexity of subgame perfect equilibria in quantitative reachability games
- Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
- Dynamic price competition
- Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
- On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium
- Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons
- Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result
- ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES
- Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.
- Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games
- Finitely additive dynamic programming
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Privately observed time horizons in repeated games
- Limit games and limit equilibria
- Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
- Forecast horizons for a class of dynamic games
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information
- Doing it now, later, or never
- Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with common preferences at the limit
- Markov perfect equilibrium existence for a class of undiscounted infinite-horizon dynamic games
- Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?
- On Markov equilibria in dynamic inventory competition
- Bargaining in dynamic markets
- Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
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