Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01260-6zbMath1479.91017OpenAlexW3014717771MaRDI QIDQ2061123

Jeroen Kuipers, Gijs Schoenmakers, Janos Flesch

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01260-6

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumperfect information gamerecursive game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (1)

Costless delay in negotiations

Cites Work

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