The theory of extensive form games

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3zbMath1410.91003OpenAlexW2496622639MaRDI QIDQ346678

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Publication date: 29 November 2016

Published in: Springer Series in Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3

zbMATH Keywords

decision-makingextensive form gamesperfect information games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (11)

Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures ⋮ Parameterized games of perfect information ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form ⋮ Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices ⋮ Backward induction in games without perfect recall ⋮ A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation ⋮ The Category of Node-and-Choice Forms, with Subcategories for Choice-Sequence Forms and Choice-Set Forms ⋮ Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games ⋮ Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems

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