Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.009zbMath1437.91062arXiv1911.02918OpenAlexW2995182017WikidataQ126582099 ScholiaQ126582099MaRDI QIDQ2173420

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Paolo Leonetti, Fabio Maccheroni

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.02918

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral equivalenceinvariant transformationsextensive game structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (1)

Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The theory of extensive form games
• Set-theoretic equivalence of extensive-form games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• The basic algebra of game equivalences
• A new game equivalence, its logic and algebra
• A simplifiction of games in extensive form
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Extensive Games

This page was built for publication: Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures