scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992

Cited in

(28)

Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
Logic and Game Theory
Core implementation via dynamic game forms
On extensive games and almost complete information
The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class
Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
Simplification of games in extensive form
Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
Internal correlation in repeated games
Large extensive form games
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study
Unverschr�nkte Graphen und strategische Spiele in kombinatorischer Form
On the equivalence of normal and extensive form representations of games
Set-theoretic equivalence of extensive-form games
Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty
A note of tight extensive game forms
Permanently Optimal Strategies in Extensive Games
Ideal reactive equilibrium
Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games
Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
Ordinality of solutions of noncooperative games
The chain-store paradox revisited

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