scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992

Cited in

(29)

The chain-store paradox revisited
Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
A note of tight extensive game forms
Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
Set-theoretic equivalence of extensive-form games
On extensive games and almost complete information
Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class
Simplification of games in extensive form
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
Internal correlation in repeated games
Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
Core implementation via dynamic game forms
Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
Large extensive form games
Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study
Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
Ordinality of solutions of noncooperative games
Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
Ideal reactive equilibrium
Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games
Logic and Game Theory
Permanently Optimal Strategies in Extensive Games
Unverschr�nkte Graphen und strategische Spiele in kombinatorischer Form
On the equivalence of normal and extensive form representations of games
Solid outcomes in finite games
The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty

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